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Abstract
This article discusses and analyzes three distinct legal doctrines available to the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (the “OCC” or the “Office”) to issue policy statements and interpre-
tive letters enabling banks to participate in transactions designed to restructure developing-country
debt. Additionally, this article comments on Regulation K, promulgated by the Federal Reserve
Board (the “Board”), which the Board twice amended in recent months to grant U.S. banks more
investment flexibility in foreign operations.
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I. ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL OVERVIEW
At the middle of 1988, commercial bank lending to the
world's fifteen most heavily indebted countries' totaled ap-
proximately US$400 billion, nearly all floating rate and de-
nominated in U.S. dollars.2 U.S. commercial banks held
slightly more than US$70 billion of the troubled developing
countries' debt with Japanese and European banks and other
nonbank financial institutions around the world accounting for
the balance.3 Total foreign debt held by U.S. commercial
banks at the end of 1987 equaled US$291 billion, having de-
clined steadily from a peak of US$359 billion in December
1983. 4 As a percent of total U.S. bank capital, 5 foreign expo-
sure likewise fell from a high of 499% in 1982 to 255% at the
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rency. The opinions expressed in this article are not necessarily those of the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency.
1. The "Baker 15" countries, originally designated by Secretary of the Treasury
James Baker III in 1986, consist of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, the Philippines,
Bolivia, Colombia, Ivory Coast, Ecuador, Morocco, Nigeria, Peru, Uruguay, Vene-
zuela, and Yugoslavia. Dullforce, Creditors Urged to Assist Heavily Indebted Nations, Fin.
Times, Sep. 2, 1988, at 1, col. 3.
2. Statistical information provided by the Office of the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency.
3. For purposes of calculating total country exposure of principal accounts
owed, the debt obligations of both public sector and private borrowers are aggre-
gated.
4. R. Clarke, Statement of the Comptroller of the Currency before the Commit-
tee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States Senate 7 (May 25, 1988)
[hereinafter Comptroller's Statement] (available at the Fordham International Law Jour-
nal office).
5. Bank capital, or primary capital, is defined to include the following balance
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end of 1987.6 This decrease over the last five years resulted
from two factors: a US$58 billion increase in capital and a
US$61 billion decline in total foreign lending.7
Despite the substantial decrease in overall U.S. commer-
cial bank exposure to the most troubled developing countries
and to foreign borrowers generally, the twenty-nine largest
federally-chartered U.S. commercial banks' reported a 50% in-
crease in 1987 over 1986 for non-performing assets as a per-
cent of total assets. 9 Accordingly, non-performing assets held
by these twenty-nine largest national banks rose from 2.4% in
1986 to 3.59% in 1987, with the increase largely attributable
to the banks' developing-country loans.'0 Testifying to the
magnitude of the developing country problem for U.S. banks,
Chase Manhattan Corporation, the second largest banking in-
stitution in the United States, recently reported to its share-
holders that "the largest uncertainty facing Chase and the en-
tire banking system remains the outlook for LDC debt, particu-
larly in Latin America.""
In October 1985, Secretary of the Treasury James A.
Baker III, announced a comprehensive initiative (the "Baker
Initiative") for addressing the problems in troubled develop-
ing countries of excessive debt, slow economic growth, and in-
adequate management of local economies. 12  From 1985
sheet items: shareholders' equity, undivided profits, earned surplus, and allowance
for loan and lease losses.
6. Comptroller's Statement, supra note 4, at 7.
7. id.
8. At the end of 1987, some 29 national banks held total assets of more than
US$10 billion. The following institutions, all regulated by the Office of the Comp-
troller of the Currency (the "OCC"), fall into this category: Fidelity Bank, N.A.; Seat-
tle-First National Bank; Connecticut National Bank; First Fidelity Bank, N.A.; Texas
Commerce Bank, N.A.; National Westminster Bank, USA; Citizens & Southern Na-
tional Bank; Wachovia Bank & Trust Company, N.A.; Sovran Bank, N.A.; Citibank
South Dakota, N.A.; Southeast Bank, N.A.; Bank of New England, N.A.; National
Bank of Detroit; Pittsburgh National Bank; North Carolina NB of NC; First Union
National Bank, NC; First Bank, N.A.; Republic National Bank of New York; First
RepublicBank Dallas, N.A.; Marine Midland Bank, N.A.; Mellon Bank, N.A.; First Na-
tional Bank of Boston; Continental Illinois NB&TA; First National Bank of Chicago;
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.; Security Pacific National Bank; Bank of America NT&SA;
Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.; Citibank, N.A.
9. Comptroller's Statement, supra note 4, at 7.
10. Id.
11. CHASE MANHATrAN CORP., 1987 ANNUAL REPORT 4 (1988).
12. Program For Sustained Growth: Joint Annual Meeting of the International
Fund and the World Bank 3 (Oct. 8, 1985) (statement of Secretary of the Treasury
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through mid-1988, holders of nearly US$8 billion of develop-
ing-country'debt with a history of non-performance, payment
interruption, or rescheduling of original principal and interest
obligations have exchanged that debt for equity ownership in-
terests in a variety of public and private investments situated
within the. developing countries. The benefits of debt-for-eq-
uity ("debt-equity") conversion redound both to debtor and
creditor and advance the major goals of debt management:
improved economic performance and long-term growth for
the developing country, and reduced vulnerability to risk on
developing-country loans for the international banking sys-
tem.' 3 Creditors exchange non-performing assets with market
values less than the original contractual amount for equity
ownership interests in productive enterprises. If successful,
this allows creditors to recover their original investment and,
in addition, offers the potential for appreciation, protected in
part from the severe inflation experienced by many debtor
countries. As the burden of debt service declines, a develop-
ing country may also expect to devote more of its resources to
growth of the internal economy and thereby contribute to a
more favorable economic environment for local businesses.
By rebuilding their capital generally and through specific
provisions for loan losses, banking institutions have been able
to reduce the percentage of capital at risk in developing-coun-
try loans. In the second quarter of 1987, banks set aside more
than US$12 billion.' 4 From the end of 1982, when the first
Mexican rescheduling awakened the world to the seriousness
of the debt crisis, to the end of 1987, the exposure of nine U.S.
money centers to the most heavily indebted developing coun-
tries fell from 212% of primary capital to 90%.' 5
Supportive of the Baker Initiative, federal financial regula-
tors have taken steps to assist banks in restructuring their port-
folios of troubled developing-country debt. We discuss and
analyze below three distinct legal doctrines available to the Of-
James Baker III), reprinted in Comment, Treasury Secretary James Baker's "Program for
Sustained Growth "for the International Debt Crisis: Three Steps Toward Global Financial Se-
curity, 4 DICK. J. INT'L L. 306 (1986).
13. See Frydl & Sobol, A Perspective on the Debt Crisis, 1982-87, in FED. RESERVE
BANK OF N.Y., SEVENTY-THIRD ANN. REP. 5 (1988).
14. See supra note 2.
15. Id.
1988]
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fice of the Comptroller of the Currency (the "OCC" or the
"Office") to issue policy statements and interpretive letters:,en-
abling banks to participate in transactions designed to restruc-
ture developing-country debt. Additionally, we comment on
Regulation K,' 6 promulgated by the Federal Reserve Board
(the "Board"), which the Board twice amended. in recent
months to grant U.S. banks more investment flexibility in for-
eign operations. ' 7
II. DPC POWERS OF NATIONAL BANKS
.A. Real Estate
As early as 1791, when the First Congress of the United
States considered the scope of permissible banking powers,
the doctrine of "debts previously contracted" ("DPC") became
recognized as an exception to the Hamiltonian view that
money, not land, should constitute the primary security under-
lying a national bank. 8 Due to its illiquidity, Treasury Secre-
tary Hamilton thought real property generally unsuitable as se-
curity.' 9 Twenty-five years later, on chartering the Second
Bank of the United States, Congress perpetuated the DPC doc-
trine as an exception to the general rule favoring liquid portfo-
lio assets.20
Codifying national banks' ability to own equity interests in
real estate, the National Currency Act of 186321 officially rec-
ognized DPC and did not restrict the time period for retention
of DPC real estate.22 One year later, however, the National
Bank Act of 186423 imposed on banks a five-year limitation,
16. 12 C.F.R. pt. 211 (1988).
17. 52 Fed. Reg. 30,914 (1987), amended by 53 Fed. Reg. 5358 (1988) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. § 211.5(f)).
18. See Act Incorporating Bank of U.S., ch. 10, § 7(VIII), 1 Stat. 191 (1791) (ex-
pired). Restrictions on the power to hold real estate originated in the charter of the
First National Bank of the United States. However, included in that same charter was
the power to hold real estate "conveyed to it in satisfaction of debts previously con-
tracted in the course of its dealings." Id.
19. See SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, 88TH CONG., IST SEss., FED-
ERAL BANKING LAWS AND REPORTS, 1780-1912, at 24-25 (Comm. Print 1963).
20. Act Incorporating Bank of U.S., ch. 44, § 11(7), 3 Stat. 266, 271-72 (1816)
(expired).
21. National Currency Act of 1863, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665. The 1863 Act was sub-
sequently revised and reenacted by the National Bank Act of 1864. See infra note 23.
22. Id. § 14, 12 Stat. at 669.
23. National Bank Act of 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (codified as amended in
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responding to a concern that an indefinite holding of equity
real estate could transform a bank into "a monopoly in the ac-
quisition of real estate .... -24 Without substantive modifica-
tions to the DPC provision, the 1863 and 1864 Acts have for
the last 125 years defined the circumstances Under which na-
tional banks could own interests in real property other than
bank premises. The modem section 29 provides that banks
can hold and convey title to real estate in two circumstances:
(1) for the transaction of business (i.e., business premises) and
(2) as a result of debts previously contracted.2 5
In 1980, Congress amended, section 2926 by granting the
Comptroller of the Currency discretion to approve a bank's
holding of real estate for a period longer than five years if the
bank makes a good faith attempt to dispose of the property
within the first five years or if disposal within the first five years
would be detrimental to the bank.27
More than a century ago, the U.S. Supreme Court an-
nounced three cautions in justifying the general restrictions
placed by statute on national banks' ownership of real prop-
erty. "[I]t was to keep the capital of the banks flowing in the
daily channels of commerce; to deter them from embarking in
hazardous real estate speculations; and to prevent the accumu-
lation of large masses of such property in their hands, to be
scattered sections of 12, 19, 31 U.S.C.). For a discussion of the convoluted legislative
history of the National Bank Act, see Levin, In Search of the National Bank Act, 97 BANK-
ING L.J. 741 (1980).
24. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2020 (1864).
25. 12 U.S.C. § 29 (1982). Pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 29, national banks may hold
real estate only for the following purposes:
First. Such as shall be necessary for its accommodation in the transaction
of its business.
Second. Such as shall be mortgaged to .it in good faith by way of security
for debts previously contracted.
Third. Such as shall be conveyed to it in satisfaction of debts previously
contracted in the course of its dealings.
Fourth. Such as it shall purchase at sales under judgments, decrees, or
mortgages held by the association, or shall purchase to secure debts due to
it.
Id. The OCC has promulgated regulations, codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 7.3020, 7.3025
(1988), which implement the above provisions.
26. Depository Institution Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 [hereinafter DIDA].
'27. Id. § 701, 94 Stat. at 186.
1988]
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held . . . in mortmain. ' '28
Guided by these three broad judicial cautions and consis-
.tent with long-standing statutory authority, recent OCC inter-
pretive letters adhere to the principle that exchanges of debt
for real estate are permissible when banks act in good faith to
salvage doubtful loans. Real estate speculation, on the other
hand, provides no basis for justifying the use of DPC.2 9
B. Securities
Legal authority permitting banks to acquire securities,
both shares of stock and debt obligations, in satisfaction of
debts previously contracted or in settlement of disputed
claims, emanated originally from case law. In affirming the
right of a national bank to accept shares of stock in a railroad,, a
bank, and a coal mining company in partial satisfaction of a
non-performing loan, the U.S. Supreme Court in 1876 granted
national banks the authority to transact "all such incidental
powers necessary to carry on .... . the business of banking.30
The Court stated:
In the honest exercise of the power to compromise a doubt-
ful debt owing to a bank, it can hardly be doubted that
stocks may be accepted in payment and satisfaction, with a
view to their subsequent sale or conversion into money so
as to make good or reduce anticipated loss. Such a transac-
tion would not amount to dealing in stocks.... Of course,
all such transactions must be compromises in good faith,
and not mere cloaks or devices to cover unauthorized prac-
tices.3 '
Sixty-one years later, a unanimous Supreme Court of Ala-
28. Union Nat'l Bank v. Matthews, 98 U.S. 621, 626 (1878); see First Nat'l Bank
v. Comptroller of the Currency, 697 F.2d 674, 681 (5th Cir. 1983).
29. See, e.g., OCC Interpretive Letter from W.R. Dehnke, Senior Attorney (Jan.
21, 1983) (available from Communications Office, Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency) (since purpose of 12 U.S.C. § 29 was to prevent real estate speculation by
national banks, bank's purchase of non-DPC parcel adjacent to already owned DPC
real estate was found illegal); OCC Interpretive Letter from J.E. Shockey, Deputy
Chief Counsel (Oct. 2, 1975) (available from Communications Office, Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency) (bank could not "secure" US$75,000 of US$375,000
debt by advancing US$350,000 to purchase property owned'by third party in debt to
bank's borrower, with subsequent intent to resell at US$75,000 profit).
30. First Na'l Bank v. Nat'l Exchange Bank, 92 U.S. 122, 127 (1875); see John
A. Roebling Sons' Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 30 F. 744 (D.W. Va. 1887).
31. First Nat'l Bank v. Nat'l Exchange Bank, 92 U.S. at'128.
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bama interpreted the forerunner of 12 U.S.C. § 24(7) to per-
mit the First National Bank of Birmingham to endorse a note
held as security, and thereby convert it into a negotiable in-
strument (a modern day investment security), in satisfaction of
a borrower's failure to perform. The court held: "[W]e do not
think the restriction on the business of dealing in securities by
buying and selling them was intended to be a restriction on
negotiating promissory notes taken and sold in ordinary bank
transactions .... "32
Regulations issued by the OCC, moreover, clearly permit
banks to hold securities DPC and distinguish the investment
securities limitation from permitted DPC transactions: "The
restrictions and limitations of this part [12 C.F.R. Part 1] do not
apply to securities acquired through foreclosure on collateral,
or acquired in good faith by way of compromise of a doubtful
claim or to avoid a loss in connection with a debt previously
contracted." 3
3
Recent OCC interpretive letters likewise allow banks to ac-
quire and hold securities DPC. In an interpretive letter dated
December 12, 1973, the Office reviewed statutory and regula-
tory precedent in finding that national banks may "acquire the
stock of any corporation to prevent loss on a debt previously
contracted in good faith."' 34 This letter recognized a five-year
holding period for corporate shares3 5 and a two-year holding
period for shares of affiliate banks acquired DPC.3 6
In another OCC interpretive letter,37 the Office reviewed
the foreclosure rights of three national banks that participated
in a US$5.5 million loan to a corporate debtor. When the
32. Bouchelle v. First Nat'l Bank, 233 Ala. 598, 599, 173 So. 83, 84 (1937).
33. Regulation 1, Investment Securities, 12 C.F.R. § 1.12 (1988).
34. OCC Interpretive Letter from J.D. Gwin, Deputy Comptroller of the Cur-
rency (Dec. 3, 1973) (available from Communications Office, Office of the Comptrol-
ler of the Currency). q
35. The five-year time limitation on holding securities DPC may be traced to a
similar limitation contained in 12 U.S.C. § 29 (real estate), prior to its amendment by
DIDA, supra note 26, in 1980.
36. Accord OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER'S
HANDBOOK FOR NATIONAL BANK EXAMINERS § 203.1 (1982). A bank's own stock may
be received DPC, with the limitation that it be held no more than six months. See 12
U.S.C. § 83 (1982).
37. OCC Interpretive Letter from J.E. Shockey, Deputy Chief Counsel (Feb. 3,
1976) (available from Communications Office, Office of the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency).
19881
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debtor declined to honor the terms of various share repur-
chase agreements with the banks and individual bank directors,
the Comptroller found that purchasing additional (minority)
shares owned by individual directors would facilitate an ulti-
mate sale of the entire debtor corporation. Accordingly, the
Office held DPC applicable to the acquisition by the national
banks of shares in a debtor corporation (1) taken as collateral
from the corporation and (2) through individual purchase ar-
rangements with individual directors of the banks.
C. Expansions and Limitations of DPC Power
1. Condition of the Debt
OCC precedents stop short of requiring that a loan be in
default in order to invoke the doctrine. However, the loan
must be in a very poor condition with DPC action necessary to
prevent imminent loss.
Construing 12 U.S.C. § 29, another interpretive letter,
dated July 2, 1973, addressed a construction and real estate
lending transaction where no loans were yet in default. 8 The
creditor national bank, however, projected US$2-5 million of
payment shortfalls by the borrower and estimated the bor-
rower's net worth to be negative US$15 million. To achieve an
orderly liquidation of indebtedness, the Office approved the
bank's proposal to purchase eight parcels of land on which it
held mortgages at 90% of appraised value, requiring a pay-
ment of US$2.85 million of new cash. Relying on both
paragraphs three (DPC authority) and four (foreclo-
sure/judgment purchases) of 12 U.S.C. § 29, the letter also
found that property held DPC should not be subject to the
lending limitations of 12 U.S.C. § 84.
2. DPC Property Unrelated to Loan: Subsequent
Exchanges
Using DPC authority, national banks are not constrained
38. OCC Interpretive Letter, from T.G. DeShazo, Deputy Comptroller of the
Currency (July 2, 1973) (available from Communications Office, Office of the Comp-
troller of the Currency); accord OCC Interpretive Letter from F.H. Ellis, Chief Na-
tional Bank Examiner (Nov. 19, 1971) (available from Communications Office, Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency) (taking of DPC property approved after bor-
rower's net worth fell dramatically to US$274,000 even though borrower remained
current on US$1.6 million loan); see also Mapes v. Scott, 88 Ill. 352 (1878).
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to acquire only assets that secure the loan or belong to the
debtor. Moreover, once a bank acquires legal title to DPC
property, it may subsequently exchange original DPC property
for other DPC property, either real estate or securities. The
holding period for property received in an exchange starts on
the date a bank first acquires property DPC.
Two recently published OCC interpretive letters3 9 provide
guidance on the permissible scope of unrelated property and
exchange transactions. Interpretive Letter No. 349 dealt with
two single family residences acquired as Other Real Estate
Owned ("OREO") by a national bank following foreclosure
proceedings. When the bank's efforts to sell the properties for
cash proved unsuccessful, the bank structured exchange trans-
actions with a third party that resulted in the bank receiving
condominium units, an additional single-family residence, and
cash. The bank did not enter into either transaction with the
intent of making a profit from a contemplated resale of the ex-
changed properties received in the sale. In addition, the bank
reduced its exposure to loss on OREO property to the extent it
received cash in the exchange transactions.
Interpretive Letter No. 349 notes that 12 U.S.C. § 29 does
not expressly prohibit real estate swaps (i.e., swapping OREO
property for other real estate) and finds that a national bank
under 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 29 has implied authority to exchange
OREO property for other real estate in appropriate circum-
stances. In so finding, the letter distinguishes older case law
where virtually no cash was involved in the exchange transac-
tions .40
Interpretive Letter No. 395 similarly relied upon implied
authority under 12 U.S.C. §§ 24(7), 29 to permit a national
bank to exchange OREO acquired DPC for preferred stock
listed on the New York Stock Exchange. The bank benefited
by improving the liquidity of assets held DPC, and the facts
demonstrated an intention to reduce loss by engaging in the
transaction. Interpretive Letter No. 395 went on to establish
39. OCC Interpretive Letter No. 395, Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 85,619
(Aug. 24, 1987); OCC Interpretive Letter No. 349, [1985-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 85,519 (Sept. 12, 1985).
40. See Williams v. Merchants' Nat'l Bank, 42 F.2d 243 (D. Minn. 1930); Kosse
Nat'l Bank v. Derden, 36 S.W.2d 295 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
1988]
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certain guidelines for future real estate/securities exchange
transactions:
(1) Once stock has been acquired in exchange for
OREO, that stock should not be further swapped for other
stock. Further transactions become too far removed from
the original OREO, speculation becomes more likely, and
the five year holding period applies in any case to the date
of original DPC acquisition.
(2) Stock received in exchange should be more mar-
ketable than the real estate given up, which tends to favor
publicly-traded securities over privately-owned companies,
particularly if the bank is left holding a minority interest.
(3) Based on the bank directors' duty to exercise due
diligence, the directors should determine that the exchange
advances the best interests of the bank (considering such
factors as value, quality and liquidity), and the directors' de-
termination should be documented.'"
3. Expenditures, Development, and Operation
Prior to 1980, judicial precedents4 2 and OCC interpretive
rulings4" allowed national banks to make expenditures and pay
construction completion charges for DPC property in circum-
stances that justified preserving the underlying DPC property
and saving the debt. To advance the same objectives, case law
and OCC precedents also allowed banks to operate non-bank-
ing businesses.44
41. OCC Interpretive Letter No. 395, Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 85,619
(Aug. 24, 1987)
42. See, e.g., Cooper v. Hill, 94 F. 582, 585 (8th Cir. 1899) (bank permitted to
expend funds for cleaning and necessary repairs in order to put OREO "in presenta-
ble condition to attract purchasers"); Cockrill v. Abeles, 86 F. 505, 511 (8th Cir.
1898) (bank authorized to purchase other interests in the same property and remove
liens and encumbrances in order for the bank to manage and dispose of the prop-
erty).
43. See, e.g., OCC Interpretive Letter from P. Nelson, Senior Attorney, Legal
Advisory Services Division (May 27, 1980) (available from Communications Office,
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency) (finding that national banks would not
engage in prohibited speculative activities by exercising the debtor's option to
purchase real estate and thereafter lease the property and a gambling business to a
third party operating group).
44. See Atherton v. Anderson, 86 F.2d 518 (6th Cir. 1936), rev'd on other grounds,
302 U.S. 643 (1937). The Atherton court explained its rationale for permitting a
bank to operate a wagon manufacturing business as follows:
[A] bank may lawfully do many things in securing and collecting its loans, in
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In 1980, as part of Depository Institutions Deregulation
Act ("DIDA"), 45 Congress amended section 29 to expand the
authority for development and improvement of DPC real estate to
"enable [the bank] to recover its total investment ' 46 after no-
tice to the OCC and subject to such regulatory conditions and
limitations as the OCC may impose. Shortly after enactment
of DIDA, the OCC issued revised policies and procedures that
established guidelines as to when banks could commit addi-
tional funds to DPC property:
It will be the policy of this Office that additional expendi-
tures to develop and improve other real estate owned may
be made only when they are:
a. Necessary to increase the fair market value of the
real property to the minimum level at which the
bank can recover its total investment; or they are
b. Reasonably calculated to significantly minimize any
shortfall between the property's fair market value
and the bank's total investment.47
Recent OCC interpretive letters have relied on the new
statutory language of section 29 and the regulatory guidelines
of our agency to define the scope of permissible expenses, de-
the enforcement of its rights and in the conservation of its property previ-
ously acquired, which it is not authorized to engage in as a primary business.
The controlling principle seems to us to be that while the bank has no
power, either express or implied, to enter upon an original speculative en-
terprise, yet as an incident to its express powers the bank has a right to
acquire property ... and where such property is a manufacturing establish-
ment whose value depends substantially upon uninterrupted operation, we
think implied power exists to continue such operation for a time providing
the primary purpose of the bank is to save its debt rather than to speculate in
future profits, and there is a reasonable prospect of realization.
id. at 525 (emphasis supplied); see also OCC Interpretive Letter from R.V. Fitzgerald,
Director, Legal Advisory Services Division (Sept. 9, 1979) (available from Communi-
cations Office, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency) (finding permissible a
bank's operation of supermarket and related lottery businesses acquired DPC); OCC
Interpretive Letter dated from H.J. Selby, First Deputy Comptroller for Operations
(Nov. 15, 1977) (available from Communications Office, Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency) (authorizing a bank subsidiary to exercise operating rights acquired
DPC in a freight forwarding business; conditions of approval included limited capital
expenditures, operation in a commercially reasonable manner, and disposition within
one year).
45. See supra note 26.
46. 12 U.S.C. § 29 (1982).
47. OCC EXAMINING BULLETIN 80-14 (Aug. 20, 1980).
54 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 12:43
velopment, and operation of DPC businesses and properties.4 8
4. Permissible Holding Period
For both real estate 49 and securities, 50 statutory authority
provides DPC holding periods of five years from the date of
acquisition. Under section 29, as amended in 1980, the Comp-
troller may extend the holding period for real estate up to an
additional five years.5 ' Since 1980, OCC interpretive letters
have not directly addressed greater than five-year holding peri-
ods for securities acquired DPC. In appropriate circumstances
and consistent with section 29's intent, the OCC in the future
may consider extending the holding period for securities
where an applicant establishes such factors as a greater likeli-
hood of investment recovery, no undue concentration of as-
sets, and a history of good-faith efforts to dispose of the secur-
ity.
Divestiture of DPC property, under the precedent of oCC
interpretive letters, is established by outright sale, entry into a
lease-purchase agreement, 52 or transfer of title to a trust for
the benefit of bank shareholders.53
48. OCC Interpretive Letter from J. Rushdoony, Attorney (Sept. 26, 1986)
(available from Communications Office, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency)
(denying a bank's request to operate a full service insurance brokerage business after
the bank obtained shares of stock DPC from a debtor engaged in administering em-
ployee benefit plans. The Office found the proposed new business to be an "in-
dependent enterprise" and lacking any concrete plan for eventual divestiture.); OCC
Interpretive Letter from R. Boylan, Director, Legal Advisory Services Division (Jan.
17, 1986) (available from Communications Office, Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency) (disallowing a bank's proposed creation of a new joint venture oil and gas
business of unspecified duration with a drilling contractor and contribution to the
venture of idle drilling rigs in exchange for common stock as too speculative and not
sufficiently related to recovery of the original DPC property); OCC Interpretive Let-
ter from M. Patriarca, Deputy Comptroller of the Currency (Apr. 2, 1985) (available
from Communications Office, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency) (authoriz-
ing a national bank to pay additional construction completion costs, ground lease
rent, taxes, building management costs and legal fees for OREO consisting of a 41
story commercial/residential building and a 13 story garage).
49. 12 U.S.C. § 29.
50. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
51. 12 U.S.C. § 29.
52. OCC Interpretive Letter from C.F. Byrd, Assistant Director, Bank Structure
& General Banking (June 24, 1981) (available from Communications Office, Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency).
53. OCC Interpretive Letter from K.W. Leaf, Regional Administrator (July 14,
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D. DPC in International Transactions
In the last year, the OCC has issued two no-objection let-
ters relying on DPC authority to permit transactions designed
to salvage developing-country debt through debt-equity swap
programs sponsored by the governments of Chile and Mex-
ico.5 4
The first proposal reviewed by the OCC involved an at-
tempt by the International Bank of Miami (the "Bank") to sal-
vage developing-country debt through the Mexican govern-
ment's debt-equity swap program (the "Mexican Program").
The Bank proposed to acquire a 60% interest in a holding
company, the sole asset of which was a resort hotel. A Swiss
management group agreed to hold the remaining 40%. The
Bank's proposal raised several novel DPC issues. The OCC
recognized the public policy interests in resolving troubled
third-world debts, the unique nature of sovereign debt, and
the fact that the Bank had little choice but to participate in the
rescheduling at terms generally imposed by the Mexican gov-
ernment.55
In the first Bank of Miami proposal, the Bank contem-
plated exchanging its portfolio of Mexican sovereign debt for
an interest in a privately owned Mexican hotel, pursuant to the
Mexican Program. The Mexican Program permits the ex-
change of foreign debt with the Mexican government for Mexi-
can currency to be invested in approved investment projects in
Mexico. The debt consisted of three loans, two of which had
been rescheduled, with repayment of the third to begin in
1989. The Mexican government, however, annnounced in
1987 a general intention to reschedule all of its debt.
In its Bank of Miami I letter, the OCC allowed the Bank to
participate in the Mexican Program. The letter addressed sev-
eral issues basic to the exercise of DPC authority. First, none
of the three loans was in an actual default. However, consis-
tent with precedent allowing the use of DPC power regardless
1975) (available from Communications Office, Office of the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency).
54. OCC No-Objection Letter No. 88-7, Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 84,047
(May 20, 1988) [hereinafter Bank of Miami III; OCC No-Objection Letter No. 87-10,
Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 84,039 (Nov. 27, 1987) [hereinafter Bank of Miami I].
55. Bank of Miami I, supra note 54.
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of the occurrence of an actual default, the letter found that the
prior rescheduling of the first and second loans combined with
an anticipated further rescheduling provided evidence of a
change in the financial capacity of the borrower sufficient to
invoke use of DPC authority.56
Further, since the debt was unsecured, the Comptroller
addressed the issue of whether to allow third party collateral in
satisfaction of the debt extinguished. Relying on OCC and ju-
dicial precedent previously discussed, the Office concluded
that the transaction would place the Bank in a better position
to recover amounts lent and did not appear to be for specula-
tive purposes. Accordingly, no objection was expressed to the
acquisition of third-party property."
Finally, the OCC determined the Bank could comply with
the requirements applicable to the disposition of OREO within
the requirements of 12 U.S.C. § 29.58 As mentioned previ-
ously, due to the Mexican Program's requirements, the Bank
would hold an interest in the company owning the hotel for at
least eight years with full repatriation not possible before thir-
teen years. However, the transaction was structured to resolve
the divestiture problem. The Bank was permitted to sell its
domestic operating subsidiary holding the DPC property and
to execute "put" and "call" agreements 59 with the Swiss group
in order to allow compliance with holding period restrictions.
The most recent interpretation of DPC authority of a na-
tional bank involving developing-country debt occurred in the
second request by the Bank of Miami. Relying upon the inter-
pretation of DPC power in Bank of Miami I, the Bank proposed
a similar transaction under the Chilean government's debt-eq-
uity swap program (the "Chilean Program"). The Bank pro-
posed to exchange its Brazilian and Venezuelan debt for quali-
fied Chilean debt and then, in turn, swap the Chilean debt
under the Chilean Program for local Chilean currency. The
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. To assure divestiture within the statutory time frame for DPC property, the
Bank negotiated a "put" with the Swiss group under which the latter agreed to buy
the Bank's interest at a future date; likewise, the Swiss group obtained from the Bank
a "call" option, permitting it to purchase the Bank's interest at a future date. Bank of
Miami I, supra note 54.
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Bank then proposed to use local currency to acquire a minority
interest in an existing Chilean insurance company. Both the
Brazilian debt and the Venezuelan debt had been rescheduled
by their respective governments and, in the case of Brazil, had
been non-performing for approximately one year.
The Chilean Program contained features similar to the
Mexican Program. Repatriation of the initial investment could
not occur for ten years, with profits (including dividends) not
subject to repatriation from Chile for three years from the date
of initial investment.
The Bank planned to acquire a minority interest (between
19% and 24%) in the insurance company in exchange for its
Chilean debt. The Bank proposed to limit its involvement in
the operation of the company to the designation of one of the
five to seven directors of the company and to comply with time
limits applicable to the sale of DPC property. The Bank in-
tended to hold its interest in a wholly owned subsidiary that, as
in Bank of Miami I, could be sold at anytime. Furthermore, the
Bank intended to enter into a "put" and "call" arrangement
for this stock with the majority shareholder of the insurance
company.
The Comptroller's Office issued a no-objection letter to
the Bank on the Chilean debt-equity swap proposal on May 20,
1988. As in the Bank of Miami I letter, the Office based its con-
clusions upon the following factors: (1) the Bank adequately
represented that the borrowers' condition (Brazil and Vene-
zuela) merited the use of DPC authority; and (2) the Bank
demonstrated, through the "put" and "call" options and the
structure of the transaction, that it was seeking to avoid a loss
on its debt and not to speculate.60
The bank subsequently proposed to establish an operating
subsidiary to hold its interest in the Chilean company. The
Comptroller's regulations provide, essentially, that a bank may
establish an operating subsidiary to engage in any activity that
could be done in the bank.6 Since it had found that the bank
could hold the property DPC, the Comptroller approved the
establishment of the subsidiary, even though it was incorpo-
60. Bank of Miami H, supra note 54.
61. 12 C.F.R. § 5.34 (1988).
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rated in Chile.62
III. REGULATION K
Bank holding companies and banks seeking to participate
in debt-equity swaps have relied on the authority to make lim-
ited equity investments abroad provided under Regulation K
of the Federal Reserve Board63 and on the statutory authority
of national banks to receive property in satisfaction of debts
previously contracted. 64 Regulation K, first promulgated in
1919, generally covers a range of equity investments that a
bank or bank holding company may hold permanently. Regu-
lation K established restrictions on the extent of a banking in-
stitution's equity position in a foreign, nonbanking enterprise,
preserving the legal separation of banking and commerce. By
contrast, banks may acquire virtually any property DPC, re-
gardless of its use or location, but the time the property may
be held is strictly limited.65 Banks and bank holding compa-
nies planning debt-equity swaps as a means of reducing expo-
sure or to acquire an equity position in a foreign enterprise
have a range of legal structures to consider. Among the
choices are investments in less than 5% of the target com-
pany's acquisition of an interest in a company doing no busi-
ness in the United States by an Edge Act subsidiary; 66 invest-
ments of up to 40% of certain companies in connection with
an official debt restructuring under the recently liberalized reg-
ulations of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem;6 7 and the acquisition of property or equity interests lo-
cated abroad in satisfaction of debts previously contracted. Fi-
nally, in addition to debt-equity swaps, some debtor countries
have explored ways to offer shares in their debt as securities,
with such credit enhancements as U.S. government obligations
supporting the issuance. In a recent transaction involving re-
scheduled Mexican debt, federal regulators authorized banks
62. See letter fromJ. Michael Shepherd, Senior Deputy Comptroller, to Antonio
Lucio, Esq. (July 15, 1988) (available from Communications Office, Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency).
63. 12 C.F.R. pt. 211 (1988).
64. 12 U.S.C. § 29 (1982).
65. Id.
66. 12 C.F.R. § 211.5 (1988).
67. See infra, notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
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to hold the securitized loans as investment securities.6 8
A. General Investment Power of Bank Holding Companies
A bank holding company may acquire up to 5% of any
company, regardless of'its line of business or its location.69
Similarly, a bank holding company may own an investment
company "which is not engaged in any business other than in-
vesting in securities, which securities do not include more than
5 per centum of the outstanding voting shares of any company
.... "70 Also exempted from the Bank Holding Company Act's
general prohibitions is the ownership of shares of any com-
pany "which does no business in the United States except as an
incident to its international or foreign business," where the
Board has found that the exemption is in the public interest
and not inconsistent with the general statutory aim of separat-
ing banking and commerce. 71 Subject to the provisions of reg-
ulations governing investments, activities, and banks abroad,
bank holding companies may own or control voting shares of
any company engaged in activities that have been found to be
"so closely related to banking or managing or controlling
banks as to be a proper incident thereto. 72
B. Limited Investments Under Regulation K
In Regulation K, which generally governs the investments
and activities abroad of U.S. bank holding companies, the
Board has promulgated an extensive regulatory structure im-
plementing these statutory provisions. 73 Regulation K im-
poses restrictions on both the type and the extent of the for-
eign activities of bank holding companies. Determined to pre-
serve the separation of banking and commerce even for
international activities, the Board limits the level of holding
company investment in firms engaged in nonpermissible activi-
68. See OCC Interpretive Letter No. 410 (Jan. 15, 1988) [hereinafter Letter No.
410] (available from Communications Office, Office of the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency).
69. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(6) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
70. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(7) (1982).
71. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(13) (1982).
72. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982). See Regulation Y for a list of activities the
Board has found to be "closely related to banking." 12 C.F.R. § 225.25 (1988).
73. 12 C.F.R. pt. 211 (1988).
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ties. In addition to the activities currently listed in Regulation
K, a subsidiary controlled by a bank or a holding company may
seek the Board's approval to engage in activities deemed
''usual in the transaction of banking and other business abroad
-74
Bank holding companies may make investments in non-
banking firms in three categories. An investing bank holding
company may acquire a going concern whose otherwise imper-
missible activities represent less than 5% of the consolidated
assets or revenues of the acquired firm. 75 Second, a bank hold-
ing company may own up to a 50% interest in an enterprise
that engages primarily in permissible activities, 76 but which de-
rives up to 10% of its assets on revenues from impermissible
activities.7 7 Finally, a holding company may make a portfolio
investment so long as the investment does not exceed 100% of
its capital.78
C. Debt-Equity Swaps
In addition to making permanent investments through the
procedures described above, holding companies may follow
the procedures provided in the 198779 and 198880 amend-
ments to Regulation K to make short-term investments in con-
nection with a debt recovery, similar to the DPC authority of
national banks. The 1987 amendment permitted bank holding
companies and nonbank subsidiaries to acquire corporations
owned by foreign governments that have restructured their
debt. With Board approval, pursuant to the procedures of
Regulation K, the amendment authorized acquisition of a cor-
poration originally owned by the debtor country where the
ownership interest was obtained either by a direct exchange
for debt obligations or purchased with funds obtained through
the payment of debt. In contrast to the "permanent" invest-
ments made abroad under Regulation K, the amendment pro-
vided that the. shares of a foreign, non-financial company ac-
74. 12 C.F.R. § 211.5(d) (1988).
75. 12 C.F.R. § 211.5(b)(1)(i)(A) (1988).
76. 12 C.F.R. § 211.5(d) (1988).
77. 12 C.F.R. § 211.5(b)(l)(i)(B) (1988).
78. 12 C.F.R. § 211.5(b)(1)(C) (1988).
79. 52 Fed. Reg. 30,912 (1987), amended by 53 Fed. Reg. 5358 (1988).
80. 53 Fed. Reg. 5358 (1988) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 211.5(f).
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quired through a debt-equity swap must be divested within five
years. The Board reserved the option to extend the period for
good cause up to an additional five years.8' Even with a short-
term investment, the amendment directed that the acquired
company not assume a similar name and that it not receive
confidential customer information from the bank.
In its commentary, the Board noted that it was permitting
investment by bank holding companies but not by banks them-
selves in order to "erect an effective barrier" betWeen banks
and foreign companies engaged in commercial activities.82
The Board asserted that this structure would include restric-
tions on transactions with affiliates contained in 12 U.S.C.
§ 371(c) to apply, as a matter of law, to transactions between
banks and their non-financial foreign company affiliates. The
commentary explained that the separation was intended to
make clear that the federal safety net insuring the bank's de-
posits would not extend to non-financial companies. Further-
more, the barrier would eliminate the pressure on banks to ex-
tend loans to an acquired corporation on preferential terms.
The commentary also emphasized that the intent of the
amendment was not to permit permanent investment in for-
eign non-financial corporations but rather to enable banks to
make temporary investments to diminish their exposure to de-
veloping countries.
In February of 1988, the Board further liberalized the pro-
visions of Regulation K to provide bankers greater flexibility in
participating in debt-equity swaps.83 It permitted United
States banking organizations to invest in up to 40% of the
shares of any private company in a debtor country, not just
those being privatized. While only sovereign debt is eligible
for exchange under these provisions, 84 the debt-equity swaps
programs of most debtor countries are only offered through a
facility established by the central bank. The Board also im-
81. These divestiture requirements are similar to the regulations of the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency for the divestiture of property acquired in satisfac-
tion of debts previously contracted. See 12 C.F.R. § 7.3020 (1988).
82. 52 Fed. Reg. 30,912, 30,913 (1987).
83. 53 Fed. Reg. 5358 (1988) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 211.5(f)).
84. See Letter from Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, to Senator William Proxmire (Feb. 18, 1988) (available from
Communications Office, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency).
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posed several qualifications to this new investment authority.
First, the banking organization may hold more than 25% of the
voting shares of the acquired company only if there is an unaf-
filiated shareholder that controls a larger percentage. Second,
the bank holding company may not extend credit to the for-
eign company in amounts greater than 50% of the total loans
and extensions of credit the company has received from all
sources. Third, the investing bank holding company's repre-
sentation on the board of directors of the acquiring company
must be proportionate to its ownership of voting shares.
Significantly, the 1988 amendment responded to the re-
quirements of certain debtors and revised the divestiture re-
quirement to extend to two years beyond the end of the period
during which full repatriation is restricted by the debtor coun-
try-up to a maximum of fifteen years. The Board also modi-
fied its prohibition against such investments being made by
banks rather than by holding companies, subject to the Board
finding that special circumstances exist.
IV. DEBT SECURITIZATION
In addition to debt-equity swaps, some debtor nations
have attempted to offer interests in their obligations to inves-
tors. These efforts to securitize debt encountered significant
accounting and regulatory barriers. Recently, the Comptroller
issued an interpretive letter permitting national banks to hold
bonds acquired in an exchange program either as loans or as
investment securities and thereby participate in a program to
restructure Mexican debt. In August 1988, the Comptroller
joined with the Board and the FDIC in issuing a private letter
ruling8 5 that approved commercial banks' participation in the
Federal Republic of Brazil's refinancing package. 86
A. Regulatory Treatment of National Bank Investments
The principal statutory provision regarding the powers of
85. See OCC Private Letter, the Board and the FDIC to William M. Friedrich,
Esq. (Aug. 4, 1988) (available from Communications Office, Office of the Comptrol-
ler of the Currency).
86. Id; see REPUBLICA FEDERATIVA DO BRASIL, FINANCING PLAN (1988) [hereinafter
FINANCING PLAN].
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national banks, 12 U.S.C. § 24(7),87 authorizes national banks
to make loans and to purchase for their own account invest-
ment securities consisting of debt obligations in the form of a
bond, note, or debenture. The authority of national banks to
purchase investment securities was authorized specifically with
the enactment of the McFadden Act in 1927.88 Recognizing
existing practice and relying in part on a no-objection letter
from the Comptroller, courts found such activity to be permis-
sible. 89
The Comptroller proposed legislation in 1924 authorizing
national banks to purchase investment securities so long as
those investments did not exceed 25% of the bank's capital
and surplus.90 These suggestions, which were enacted in the
McFadden Act, were intended to clarify banks' authority and to
provide a statutory framework for regulation.9"
The securities activities of national banks were further re-
stricted by the Glass-Steagall Act, which prohibited them from
"dealing" in securities, except to buy and sell securities for the
account of customers, and reduced to 10% the amount of capi-
tal and surplus a national bank could invest in the securities of
one obligor."2
Following the McFadden Act standards, the Comptroller's
Office has traditionally required that a debt obligation be mar-
ketable and of investment quality to be considered an "invest-
ment security."93 National banks may not hold as investments
instruments that do not meet those standards. In addition to
those factors, bank examiners look to the nature of the rela-
tionship between the bank and the debtor to determine
whether the bank is acting as a lender or as a relatively passive
investor. On a case-by-case basis, the Comptroller has recog-
nized that certain obligations in the form of a bond, note, or
debenture should be treated as loans. In those cases, the
87. 12 U.S.C. § 24(7) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
88. Ch. 191, 44 Stat. 1224 (1927).
89. See, e.g., Atherton v. Anderson, 86 F.2d 518, 532-33 (6th Cir. 1936), rev'd on
other grounds, 302 U.S. 643 (1937); Bailey v. Babcock, 241 F. 501, 515 (W.D. Pa.
1915).
90. See 1924 OCC ANN. REP. 12, 149, 151.
91. See H.R. REP. No. 83, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1926); S. REP. No. 473, 69th
Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1926); S. REP. No. 666, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1924).
92. 12 U.S.C. §§ 24(7), 78, 377, 378 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
93. See 12 C.F.R. § 1.3 (1988).
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Comptroller has based his conclusion on the nature of the
dealings between the parties.
B. The Mexican and Brazilian Refinancing Transactions
In considering the Mexican program, the Comptroller
permitted national banks to elect to hold the new bonds either
as loans or as investment securities but prohibited a single
bank from holding them in both its loan and investment port-
folios. The OCC did not object to the bonds being considered
"investment securities" since there was evidence that tended
to show that the bonds were of investment. quality and that the
secondary market in the bonds would be sufficient to ensure
their marketability. Since a bank could conclude that there
were reliable estimates that the bonds possessed these charac-
teristics, the bonds could qualify as investment securities
under 12 C.F.R. § 1.5(b)94 and could be purchased by national
banks subject to the limitations of 12 C.F.R. § 1.7(b).9" The
Office simply required that banks intending to hold the bonds
as investment securities do the research necessary to satisfy
themselves that the bonds were of investment quality and mar-
ketable. This was not significantly different from other analy-
ses of whether a new bond would qualify as an investment se-
curity.
The Brazilian financing package introduced an innovative
debt securities feature in the amount of US$5 billion. Issued
by the Republic of Brazil as investment bonds, holders of these
new securities may exchange the instruments for inflation-ad-
justed "Obriga 6es do Tesouro Nacional" ("OTNs"),96 the
Brazilian equivalent of U.S. Treasury Bonds. In addition, the
investment bonds will be redeemable at face value for
purchase of Brazilian exports as part of any future debt-for-
export program in that country. The investment bonds will be
exempt from all Brazilian taxes and will bear an interest rate of
6% per annum. The Brazilian investment bonds are struc-
tured in a way to satisfy liquidity and marketability require-
ments, with the added feature of convertability into cash for
94. 12 C.F.R. § 1.5(b) (1988).
95. 12 C.F.R. § 1.7(b) (1988).
96. See FINANCING PLAN, supra note 86, at § V-5.
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use in government-approved export programs.9 7
While some prior determinations of the OCC suggest that
national banks generally may not purchase investment securi-
ties and hold them in their loan portfolio, the OCC has permit-
ted banks to'hold investment securities as loans when the bank
purchases the security through direct negotiations with the is-
suer in a transaction that is the equivalent of making a loan. In
-the context of both the Brazilian refinancing program and the
Mexican debt-swap program, participating banks were restruc-
turing existing loans by accepting new bonds through more or
less direct negotiations with the debtor government. The
transactions, therefore, resembled the extension of a commer-
cial lending transaction. Consequently, banks that acquired
the Mexican bonds through the debt-swap program were per-
mitted to hold the bonds as loans.98 Such treatment is also
consistent with prior OCC interpretations involving develop-
ing-country debt restructuring programs. 99 In keeping with
the rationale supporting treatment of the bonds as loans,
banks acquiring the Mexican bonds in the secondary market
were not permitted to hold them in the bank's loan portfo-
lio.100
CONCLUSION
As Treasury Secretary Baker recognized when advancing a
''menu approach" to the resolution of the developing-country
debt crisis, the debt problem is so large and complex that no
single program can resolve it. Regulatory agencies are likely to
continue to provide bankers the flexibility to participate in
debt-equity swaps. These programs provide the multiple ben-
efits of (1) additional investment to spur developing-country
economic growth, (2) decreased debt service obligations owed
by debtor countries, and (3) opportunities for banking organi-
zations, especially those wishing to sustain their long-term
commitment to the debtor countries, to reduce their overall
97. Id.
98. See Letter No. 410, supra note 68.
99. See, e.g., OCC Interpretive Letter No. 288, [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 85,452 (Apr. 25, 1984) (Argentine debt restructuring pro-
gram exchanging bonds and notes for existing loans).
100. See Letter No. 410, supra note 68.
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debt exposure, while gaining the option of participating in in-
flation-hedged equity investments.
Political considerations in the debtor nations, most of
which face presidential elections in the next two years, have
limited the extent of equity investments to specific industries
and sectors often in an attempt to channel foreign investment
toward areas that face the greatest needs for infrastructure-
related economic reforms. As a consequence, banks have
faced restricted investment opportunities in the leading debtor
nations.' 0 ' Additionally, uncertainty about U.S. policy in the
new administration, including suggested debt-forgiveness
schemes,'0 2 has made both bankers and debtors more reluc-
tant to commit to major transactions. In this environment,
regulators likely will continue to encourage banks to build cap-
ital and attempt to provide flexibility to engage in transactions
like debt-equity swaps and debt securitizations.
101. See Miller, Equity Swaps Unattractive to U.S. Banks, Am. Banker, Aug. 15,
1988, at 14, col. 1.
102. Dornbush, Johnson & Krueger, Our LDC Debts, in THE UNITED STATES IN
THE WORLD ECONOMY 190-92 (M. Feldstein ed. 1987).
